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Abstract Residents of towns and villages in Arctic Alaska live on ‘‘the front line of
climate change.’’ Some communities face immediate threats from erosion and
flooding associated with thawing permafrost, increasing river flows, and reduced sea
ice protection of shorelines. The term climigration, referring to migration caused by
climate change, originally was coined for these places. Although initial applications
emphasized the need for government relocation policies, it has elsewhere been
applied more broadly to encompass unplanned migration as well. Some historical
movements have been attributed to climate change, but closer study tends to find
multiple causes, making it difficult to quantify the climate contribution. Clearer
attribution might come from comparisons of migration rates among places that are
similar in most respects, apart from known climatic impacts. We apply this
approach using annual 1990–2014 time series on 43 Arctic Alaska towns and
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villages. Within-community time plots show no indication of enhanced out-migration from the most at-risk communities. More formally, there is no significant
difference between net migration rates of at-risk and other places, testing several
alternative classifications. Although climigration is not detectable to date, growing
risks make either planned or unplanned movements unavoidable in the near future.
Keywords Climate  Migration  Climigration  Alaska  Arctic  Erosion

Introduction
The term climigration was coined by Alaska human rights lawyer Robin Bronen to
describe the ‘‘forced permanent migration of communities due to climate change’’
(Bronen 2009:68). Her paradigmatic examples are remote Alaska villages such as
Kivalina, Newtok, Shaktoolik, and Shishmaref, where predominantly indigenous
populations face growing threats to infrastructure and safety from climate-linked
erosion and flooding. Thawing permafrost, reduced shore protection from sea ice,
and increasing river flows are consequences of Arctic climate change that impact
these communities (Overpeck et al. 2005; NOAA 2015). Relocation seems
inevitable given their geographical vulnerability, but that is not happening so far
because of social resistance, difficulty, and high costs (GAO 2009; Huntington et al.
2012). New governance and institutional strategies are needed to deal with this new
category of displacement (Bronen and Chapin 2013; Marino 2012, 2015). Apart
from the personal, family, and cultural dislocations of moving, funding also remains
a large obstacle: A 2006 study estimated relocation costs for Kivalina alone
(population below 400 at the time) as $155–$251 million, depending on the site
chosen (USACE 2006). Much of that cost would go toward site work and airport
construction, new buildings, water/sewer system, and landfill. Site choice itself
remains problematic. A proposed alternative location favored in a poll of village
residents (although with some dissent) was described as ‘‘geotechnically inappropriate’’ by USACE because it sits on permafrost, or soils mostly frozen year-round.
Moreover, this alternative location is vulnerable to future threats from coastal
erosion as well. Newtok, Shishmaref, and other places face similar costs and
complications for relocation (Tribal Climate Change Project 2010).
Rural Alaska communities commonly have birth rates well above replacement
levels (Hamilton and Mitiguy 2009). The population growth that would otherwise
result, however, can be significantly augmented, offset or even reversed by migration,
which fluctuates widely in some of these small places (Hamilton and Seyfrit 1994a, b;
Hamilton 2010). Out-migration reflects a variety of push and pull factors, including
economic, educational, or social opportunities elsewhere. Movers often are people
with greater human and social capital, and include more adult women than men. Such
departures, not balanced by inflow of people with comparable attributes, have been
identified as a threat to the viability of rural communities in Alaska (Martin et al.
2008; Gerlach et al. 2011) and elsewhere (Corbett 2005, 2007).
Might some rural community out-migration in Alaska already be climigration,
happening despite government inaction but through human agency and indirect
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drivers (Black et al. 2011)? To answer this question, we look to a recently updated
demographic database on Arctic Alaska that covers many of the places most
threatened by climate-linked erosion (Saito et al. 2015). The database, containing
annual time series of population and net migration from 43 communities over
1990–2014, provides an opportunity to systematically test for climigration by
comparing out-migration rates from the most threatened communities with those
from other, generally similar places.

Climate and migration
Historical and contemporary observations establish that environmental factors can
influence migration decisions, particularly among the most vulnerable (Hunter 2005).
Geographic vulnerability by itself could be comparatively straightforward, as with
decadal-scale projections of sea-level rise along coastlines (Curtis and Schneider
2011). Behavioral response to environmental pressures, however, tends to be socially
mediated and complex, as seen even in modeling studies that take social factors into
account (Entwisle et al. 2016). Environmental ‘‘push’’ forces are clearest in the wake
of disasters, including climate-related disasters such as Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh
(Islam and Hasan 2015) or Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (DeWaard et al. 2016;
Finch et al. 2010), but these affect people with diverse resources quite differently.
Slower climate-linked disasters such as crop failures from drought have been
implicated among the causes of violent conflicts, which become an impetus for
migration as well (Parenti 2011). Such effects could drive out-migration and
destabilize weak states, making climate change a ‘‘threat multiplier’’ for Europe
(Sabathil 2010:65). Authors of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report agreed on the seriousness of displacement threats,
while expressing low confidence in specific quantitative projections due to the
complex, multi-causal nature of migration (Field et al. 2014:20).
Migration’s complex, multi-causal nature has been highlighted in social science
research. Seemingly direct environmental influences are filtered by social factors
including differences in social position, family resources, adaptation options, or
household strategies to diversify risks (Hunter et al. 2015). Qualitative case study
and ethnographic research portrays social complexity at ‘‘ground level;’’ other
studies applying event history analysis to individual or household-level data take a
nuanced quantitative approach. For example, temporary and permanent migration
responding to rainfall conditions in Burkina Faso has been analyzed by Henry et al.
(2004). Loebach (2016) examines the migration response in Nicaragua to Hurricane
Mitch. Massey et al. (2010) estimate relationships between out-migration and
environmental pressures such as firewood scarcity, declining agricultural productivity, and declining land cover. In agreement with qualitative research, event
history analyses find variation in the duration and distance of moves, partly
influenced by individual, family, and social factors.
Other methods converge on this conclusion that climate effects tend to be
contingent. In a study of displacement caused by riverbank erosion in Bangladesh,
Hutton and Haque (2004) highlight social differences in vulnerability. Comparing
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the Arctic Alaska village of Shishmaref with Nanumea, a low-lying atoll in the
Polynesian island nation of Tuvalu, Marino and Lazrus (2015) observe that both
communities face imminent, existential dangers associated with climate change.
Their respective populations (around 500–600 people each) have gained international prominence as potential ‘‘climate refugees.’’ Even in these extreme cases,
however, the authors note that disaster risks interact with other migration pressures,
which influence individual, family, and community migration decisions in complex
ways.
Given the entanglement among possible motivations to leave or stay, detecting
specifically climatic effects on migration remains a challenge. In this paper, we take
a novel quasi-experimental approach using annual population and migration time
series on 43 Arctic Alaska towns and villages, some of which face immediate,
recognized threats related to climate. The data support two kinds of analysis that
could isolate climatic from other migration effects: tracking temporal change in
migration rates within each community, or comparing median migration rates
between otherwise generally similar groups of threatened and non-threatened
communities. A temporal surge in migration as climate risks emerged, or significant
contrasts between threatened and non-threatened places, could give evidence for the
existence and scale of climate-induced migration.

Alaska’s climate-threatened communities
Communities in Arctic Alaska are small, ranging in population from as few as 20 to
over 6000. These communities are not on a state-wide road system and are
accessible from the state’s urban centers mainly by air or barge. Within
geographically large boroughs or census areas, sparse populations are typically
concentrated in one regional hub town and a number of smaller villages. In this
paper, we focus on a demographic database that covers 43 communities (Fig. 1)
including five regional hubs—Barrow, Bethel, Dillingham, Kotzebue, and Nome—
having 2014 populations of 2400–6200. Each of these five serves as the
transportation, economic, and administrative center for its respective region. The
remaining 38 places are smaller villages, having populations from about 100–900.
Socioeconomic and infrastructure contrasts between hub towns and villages are
greater, in some respects, than the contrasts between towns or between villages of
different regions (Hamilton and Seyfrit 1993).
A majority of the population in both towns and villages is Alaska Native, mainly
Inupiat or Yupik. In villages, their fraction often exceeds 85 %. With the overlay of
mainstream and traditional societies, and mixed cash/subsistence economies, these
remote communities face rapid change and complex problems (BurnSilver et al.
2016; Chance 1990; Fienup-Riordan 1990; Hamilton and Seyfrit 1994a, b; Loring
et al. 2016; NRC 2003; Jorgensen 1990; Seyfrit et al. 1998). The challenges are not
unique to Alaska but occur with variations among indigenous peoples in many parts
of the circumpolar North (Andrew 2014; Einarsson et al. 2004; Glomsrød and
Aslaken 2009; Hamilton and Rasmussen 2010; Hamilton et al. 2010; Huskey and
Southcott 2010; Krupnik and Jolly 2002; Kruse et al. 2011; Larsen et al. 2010, 2015;
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Fig. 1 Forty-three selected Arctic Alaska towns and villages (larger map), representing five different
boroughs or census areas (inset). From Hamilton and Mitiguy (2009)

Larsen and Fondahl 2015; Loring and Gerlach 2015; NRC 2003; Rasmussen et al.
2015; Young and Bjerregaard 2008).
Kivalina, an Inupiat village of some 400 people, is about 130 kilometers north of
the Arctic Circle in northwest Alaska. It sits on a gravel bar between Kivalina
Lagoon and the Chukchi Sea. With Arctic warming, sea ice has been forming later
in the fall, leaving the low shoreline exposed to erosion from powerful storms. Tens
of meters of ground have been lost already; barrier construction temporarily slowed
the loss, but the US Army Corps of Engineers estimates the location will be
uninhabitable by 2025. Evacuation from this narrow strip of land would be difficult
in rough conditions, so a major storm could pose risks. In 2008, Kivalina filed suit
against Exxon Mobil and 23 other fuel or power corporations, arguing that global
warming threatened the village’s existence, and estimating that their relocation costs
will reach $400 million (Faris 2008). Although a federal court dismissed the suit,
Kivalina’s chronic predicament continues to draw journalistic attention with
headlines such as ‘‘Will these Alaska villagers be America’s first climate change
refugees?’’ (Wernick 2015; other examples include Associated Press 2013; La
Ganga 2015). Barack Obama became the first president to visit the US Arctic in
summer 2015, when he flew into the town of Kotzebue and viewed Kivalina from
the air. The President used his visit to highlight impacts of climate change on Alaska
communities, with Kivalina as a case in point (CBC 2015).
Although Kivalina’s predicament is stark, other communities face serious
problems as well. Thawing permafrost weakens ground beneath the island
community of Shishmaref (pop. 600), while sea ice decline leaves it exposed to
wave erosion. As the shoreline retreats by more than three meters per year, houses
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have fallen into the sea, becoming iconic photo-images for climate change threats.
Shaktoolik (pop. 260) and some others are in similarly precarious coastal locations,
but not all of the climate-threatened communities are coastal. Selawik (pop. 850),
for instance, is experiencing widespread building and infrastructure damage as
ground subsides with thawing permafrost, while erosion consumes land along the
banks of Selawik River and Selawik Lake. Throughout Arctic Alaska, less visible
but dangerous impacts also come from shorter cold seasons and lower predictability
for travel across ice.
Responding to statewide concern about climate change impacts, in 2007 Alaska’s
governor established a Climate Change Sub-Cabinet. The Immediate Action
Workgroup (IAWG), part of this cabinet, assessed risks to communities based on
four criteria: (1) safety of life during a reasonably foreseeable storm or flood event;
(2) potential loss of critical infrastructure; (3) health threats to the community as
defined by CDC or the Health Department; and (4) potential loss of 10 % or more of
residential dwellings (IAWG 2009). The IAWG analysis identified six ‘‘priority atrisk’’ communities facing the most urgent threats. Kivalina is of course on this list,
along with Koyukuk, Newtok, Shaktoolik, Shishmaref, and Unalakleet (IAWG
2009).
Independently, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducted
a baseline erosion assessment from 2005 to 2009 (USACE 2009). They applied a
weighted scoring system based on: (1) critical infrastructure; (2) human health and
safety; (3) subsistence and shoreline use; (4) community setting/geographic
location; (5) housing and population affected; (6) housing in parallel; (7)
environmental hazard; (8) cultural importance; and (9) commercial/non-residential.
Scores on each criterion were summed for 178 communities; 26 of these (including
Kivalina) having overall scores more than one standard deviation above the mean
were characterized as ‘‘priority action’’ communities.
A third list of communities facing climate-related risks to their water
infrastructure or resources was compiled Tetra Tech (2010), in a study by
commissioned by the state government. The Tetra Tech assessment excluded places
already identified as ‘‘priority at-risk’’ in the IAWG study. Their report lists 25
communities where water supplies are imperiled and need ‘‘priority study,’’ and 24
others also imperiled but in the less urgent category of concern, needing additional
study.
These three reports provide alternative lists of which Alaska communities are
most impacted or threatened by climate-related problems. Net out-migration is
substantial from many parts of rural Alaska, but is it any greater from threatened
places than elsewhere? If so, that could be a clear signal of climate impacts on
migration, occurring even without government support. A demographic database
covering 43 Arctic Alaska towns and villages, with yearly net migration estimates
for 1991 through 2014, permits direct tests of this hypothesis.
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Data and methods
We focus here on a diverse set of communities from five Alaska regions: the North
Slope and Northwest Arctic boroughs, along with the Nome, Bethel, and Dillingham
census areas. Not all of these places lie north of the Arctic Circle, but they are
characterized by generally Arctic landscapes and conditions. Within the five
regions, 43 communities represent a range of environments and access to resources
(Hamilton and Mitiguy 2009; Hamilton et al. 2012). Figure 1 maps these
communities, with regions named in the inset.
Our database on these 43 places, organized with one observation for each place/
year, includes temperature and precipitation estimates at each community’s location
for every month since January 1979, derived from reanalysis described by
Rienecker et al. (2011).1 Demographic variables include population, births, deaths,
and net migration estimates for each community in each fiscal year (roughly July 1–
June 30) since 1990. At this writing, the time series are complete through 2014.
Annual estimates of population in each community, between the decennial US
Census years, come from the Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce
Development (ADL 2015). These are based partly on Permanent Fund Dividend
applications—a unique Alaska data resource that supports relatively accurate
population estimates. Separately, the Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics records births
and deaths for each community. By combining population with births and deaths,
we estimate the annual net migration.
Time plots visualize population trends in each community, as illustrated for the
Northwest Arctic hub town of Kotzebue in Fig. 2.2 Kotzebue’s 2014 population of
about 3200 people is more than 70 % Alaska Native, primarily Inupiat. Bars in the
lower portion of Fig. 2 indicate the total number of deaths (dark bars) and births
(lighter bars) for each fiscal year, July 1–June 30 (original data from ADL 2015 and
the Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics; for definitions, see Saito et al. 2015). The
number of deaths per year ranged from 9 to 23, and the number of births to residents
from 55 to 105. These seemingly exact counts of births, deaths, and population are
of course subject to minor errors. A scale for deaths and births appears at lower right
in Fig. 2. On average, about 58 more births than deaths occurred each year. Without
out-migration, the population would be constantly increasing.
Short line segments that extend above the main curve in Fig. 2 indicate net outmigration, inferred from a population that is lower than would be expected due to
natural increase alone. For example, Kotzebue’s estimated population for July 1,
2013 was 3199. Over the next 12 months, 55 births and 12 deaths were recorded, so
by natural increase alone the 2014 population should have been
3199 ? 55 - 12 = 3242. This value is indicated by the top of the vertical line
segment for 2014. In fact, however, the estimated 2014 population was 3153,
suggesting net out-migration of 3242 - 3153 = 89 people—the length of the
vertical line segment descending to the curve marking actual (estimated) population.
1

The complete database is published online (Saito et al. 2015).

2

A full set of 43 population plots, along with others showing time series of temperature and precipitation
at each community’s location, appear in Saito et al. 2015 and can be freely used with acknowledgment.
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Fig. 2 Population dynamics of Kotzebue, Alaska, 1990–2014. Gray bars show number of births and
deaths; vertical lines indicate estimated net migration (population and birth/death numbers graphed from
different baselines, but with comparable y-axis scales)

A line segment below the main curve, as in 2000 or 2004, indicates net in-migration,
or population growth exceeding that expected from natural increase. Although
Kotzebue experienced a few years with net in-migration, in most years more people
left than arrived. The average annual loss was about 40 people, partially offsetting
natural increase, so that total population growth slowed and sometimes declined.
Diverse patterns of population change occur among the 43 Arctic communities.
Different settlements within the same region can be growing, shrinking, or roughly
stable, depending on net migration. Annual changes in small communities could
reflect chance or unique local events. The next section steps back to view larger
patterns.

General patterns of change
In 1990, the 43 Arctic settlements had a combined population of about 29,000. By
2014, this had grown to almost 36,000. There were approximately 15,000 more
births than deaths over this period, so natural increase was offset by net outmigration of nearly 8000 people. Year-to-year fluctuations are erratic in each place,
but overall summaries help to clarify the big picture.
Figure 3 graphs median annual crude birth and death rates for these communities
from 1991 to 2014. (Medians and related tests are employed throughout our
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Fig. 3 Median annual birth and death rates for 43 towns and villages, 1991–2014

Fig. 4 Median annual net migration rates for 43 towns and villages, 1991–2014
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analysis, due to their resistance to outliers and better performance with skewed
distributions.) The wide surplus of births over deaths in all years creates pressure
toward continual population growth. Birth rates declined from initially high levels
in the early 1990s and then gradually rose again after the mid-2000s, reflecting an
echo boom from the earlier era of high birth rates. The final years hint at recent
decline, but neither death nor birth rates exhibit sustained trends.
Figure 4 graphs the median net migration estimates for these 43 places over
1991–2014. Whereas natural increase was always positive, net migration for most
years was negative. Sharp interannual swings invite speculation, but general
explanations thus far have proven to be elusive. Net migration is often viewed as a
social indicator in the North, sensitive to shifting push and pull factors (Hamilton
2010; Howe et al. 2014). Rapid response has been documented in connection with
fisheries troubles in subarctic Alaska (Himes-Cornell and Hoelting 2015),
Newfoundland (Hamilton and Butler 2001; Hamilton 2007) and the Faroe Islands
(Hamilton et al. 2004), and in connection with economic and administrative
contraction in post-Soviet Russia (Heleniak and Bogoyavlensky 2015; Voinov et al.
2004).
Caught between necessity, limited resources, and very limited supply options,
rural Alaska communities are exceptionally vulnerable to the price of fuel and
market foods (Ford et al. 2006; Loring and Gerlach 2009). Two events in 2008—a
sharp rise in fuel prices early that year, and a global recession starting in August—
seemed likely to have particularly harsh consequences that could drive outmigration (Martin et al. 2008). Counterintuitively, however, net out-migration in
2008 was less than the year before. Over the next 5 years, it went even lower. The

Fig. 5 Population dynamics of Kivalina, Alaska, 1990–2014
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lack of a migration response after 2008 suggests that these Alaska places exhibit less
short-term sensitivity to economic events, compared with some other Northern
places such as fisheries-dependent communities of the North Atlantic Arc (e.g.,
Hamilton and Butler 2001; Hamilton et al. 2004; Hamilton 2007). In the next
section, we test for a longer-term response to climate stress.

Migration from climate-stressed places
The Northwest Arctic Borough village of Kivalina faces perhaps the most acute
climate-related threats, both from inexorable erosion and the sudden danger of
storms. The risks are known throughout the state and all too obvious to Kivalina
residents, who have seen ground lost a few steps from homes and school, and
experienced several storm-driven evacuations (Lane 2012). Federal and state efforts
to date have not approached levels needed to move people out permanently or
relocate the whole village, nor are residents of one mind on what should happen. But
while top-level decisions are not made, might some individuals and families vote
with their feet? Kivalina’s population history, graphed in Fig. 5, gives no indication
of this happening on a substantial scale. Out-migration has been consistent but
relatively small, so the population has continued to grow—up by almost 50 people
(a 12 % increase) since 2005.
What about other places? Our demographic database includes many of those
listed as threatened in three reports described earlier. Four database communities,
Table 1 Median annual 2000–2014 rates of net migration and population change, shown with 95 %
confidence intervals and F tests from quantile regression using robust standard errors, comparing erosionthreatened, and other Arctic Alaska communities (n = 645 place/years)
Classification (#)

Median annual
Net migration %

Median annual
Population change %

USACE 2009
Priority action (10)

-1.50 (-2.04, -0.96)

0.65 (0.17, 1.14)

Others (33)

-1.60 (-2.04, -1.17)

0.31 (-0.14, 0.77)

F test

F(1, 643) = 0.08, p = 0.77

F(1, 643) = 1.00, p = 0.32

IAWG 2009
Priority at-risk (4)

-1.43 (-2.04, -0.82)

0.72 (0.18, 1.25)

Others (39)

-1.65 (-2.04, -1.27)

0.38 (-0.00, 0.77)

F test

F(1, 643) = 0.36, p = 0.55

F(1, 643) = 0.97, p = 0.33

Tetra Tech 2010
Priority study (11)

-1.76 (-2.67, -0.86)

0.70 (-0.23, 1.61)

Concern (7)

-2.37 (-3.69, -1.06)

0.00 (-1.23, 1.23)

Others (25)

-1.46 (-1.84, -1.08)

0.44 (0.08, 0.79)

F test

F(2, 642) = 0.97, p = 0.38

F(2, 642) = 0.40, p = 0.67

All (43)

-1.57 (-1.93, -1.21)

0.44 (0.09, 0.78)
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including Kivalina, are classed as ‘‘priority at-risk’’ in IAWG (2009). Ten database
communities (including these four) are classed as ‘‘priority action’’ in the USACE
(2009) report. The Tetra Tech report (2010) provides a third, non-overlapping list of
places warranting ‘‘priority’’ or ‘‘concern.’’ Eighteen of these places also occur in
our data. These three reports thus provide alternative ways to classify subsets of
Arctic Alaska communities that are most stressed by climate change-related erosion
and water problems.
Table 1 makes a systematic comparison of net migration and population change
rates, contrasting USACE, IAWG, and Tetra Tech prioritized places with the others
in our data. To focus on recent developments as erosion and water problems became
more acute, only the years from 2000 to 2014 are used for this analysis (43
places 9 15 years = 645 place/years). Medians and confidence intervals for these
groups over 2000 to 2014 are estimated by quantile regression, as are the F tests for
differences among medians (more precisely, differences among 0.5 quantiles). The
quantile approach does not require normal or Gaussian errors, which are implausible
for these data. Given the clustered data structure, we also cannot assume that errors
are independent and identically distributed. Consequently, the analysis employs
robust standard errors or variance estimates for all confidence intervals and tests
(Koenker 2005; calculations done with Stata 14.1, see Hamilton 2013).
Regardless of which classification scheme we use, none of the comparisons
shows significant differences in median net migration or population change rates—

Fig. 6 Population dynamics of 10 ‘‘priority action’’ communities identified by the US Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE 2009). Kivalina, Shaktoolik, Shishmaref, and Unalakleet are also among the ‘‘priority
at-risk’’ communities identified by IAWG (2009)
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as seen either from F tests or the overlapping confidence intervals in Table 1. Thus,
we have no evidence of greater net out-migration from the priority communities, or
of lower rates of population change. If anything, the threatened places (by either
USACE or IAWG criteria) are growing faster than others: Their median net
migration is slightly less negative, and population growth rates slightly higher.
Figure 6 elaborates the summary results graphically by showing 1990–2014
population change in the 10 USACE ‘‘priority action’’ communities that occur in
our Arctic dataset. (The four IAWG ‘‘priority at-risk’’ communities in our data—
Kivalina, Shaktoolik, Shismaref, and Unalakleet—comprise a subset of these 10, so
they also appear in Fig. 6.) These 10 places exhibit a range of different patterns. For
example, Selawik grew steadily with minor out-migration through these years. With
proportionately more out-migration, the population of Deering gradually declined.
Several places show signs of growth pausing or reversing due to higher net outmigration in the middle of this period, but the timing is not synchronous, and slow
or negative growth has been followed by more recent increase. Unalakleet stands
out visually in Fig. 6 due to its relatively large decline (more than 100 people) after
1999, corresponding to collapse and closure of the local king salmon fishery (Kent
and Bergstrom 2012). Even in Unalakleet, however, population subsequently
resumed growing.
Both the formal tests in Table 1 and the informal comparison in Fig. 6
underscore the lack of evidence for climigration to date. People are not leaving at
higher rates; on the contrary, rising populations in many places mean that more
people are potentially exposed to adverse effects now than when these reports were
commissioned or published their warnings.

Discussion
In the original usage of climigration (Bronen 2009), and discussions about the
threatened Alaska communities, climate-driven relocation has been framed largely
in terms of the need for government action. But government action has been limited
(Marino 2015) and given the rising costs of relocation that may not soon be
forthcoming. Outside Alaska, climate-driven migration is often framed in terms of
individual or family agency, occurring with or without government support. Many
factors enter into migration decisions, however, making it difficult to distinguish a
climatic component. Our quasi-experimental approach involves tracking net
migration over time in threatened and non-threatened communities, and comparing
overall migration rates of otherwise similar places classified by risk criteria.
The hypothesis of unplanned climigration seems plausible for Arctic Alaska
communities because in recent history, their migration flows have been volatile,
substantially affecting populations (Hamilton and Mitiguy 2009). Surveys of Arctic
Alaska high school students in the 1990s found that more than half expected to
migrate permanently away from their home regions (Hamilton and Seyfrit 1993;
Seyfrit et al. 1998). Although actual out-migration rates prove to be lower, with
many non-permanent moves, going away (or not) remains a major life choice that
measurably affects source community demographics—for example, by skewing sex
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ratios as women disproportionately leave the villages (Hamilton and Seyfrit 1994b;
Howe 2009; Huskey et al. 2004; Martin 2009; for a European counterpart, see
Leibert 2015). Individual and family migration decisions have similarly large
effects in many other parts of the North (Hamilton et al. 2004; Hamilton and
Rasmussen 2010; Heleniak and Bogoyavlensky 2015; Himes-Cornell and Hoelting
2015; Huskey and Southcott 2010; Larsen et al. 2010, 2015; Rasmussen 2011).
Migration is a complex phenomenon. Black et al. (2011) suggest a non-regional
framework for understanding how the environment, acting together with economic,
political, social, and demographic drivers, affects migration. Direct environmental
pressures include impacts on ecosystem services, which in the Alaska case support
subsistence food harvesting and inter-community travel, along with settlement
infrastructure including homes, schools, water, and power supplies. Moreover,
environmental change can raise what Black et al. term ‘‘the hazardousness of
place,’’ a description that well suits Alaska communities with growing flood risks to
infrastructure and people. Black et al. emphasize the role of human agency in
migration decisions, a role that underlies our use of net migration as an indicator.
But this indicator shows no visible response to environmental stress to date, which
serves to emphasize that human agency can work against migration as well as for it.
Pressures to move are countered by reasons people might not want to leave their
ancestral homes, or lack appealing alternatives (Adams 2015; Marino 2015). La
Ganga (2015) quotes a longtime Kivalina resident:
When… asked why her people don’t move—somewhere, anywhere to be
safe—she is polite but firm. The land and the water make the Inupiat who they
are. If they moved to Kotzebue, they would be visitors. Moving to Anchorage
or Fairbanks, she said, ‘‘would be like asking us not to be a people any more.’’
Instead of their populations declining through out-migration, many of the threatened
places are growing—raising both the potential costs of relocation and the number of
people exposed to risks. Meanwhile, the physical threats are not diminished.
Permafrost thaws, rivers rise, and shorelines erode; on decadal timescales, sea level
could be an increasing factor as well. State or federal action sufficient to relocate
these communities does not yet appear imminent.
The fact that imperiled rural communities are growing despite net out-migration
raises a final question about how demographics are changing in the state, and how
they will influence vulnerability to climate change and extreme events. Some
limited work has been done looking at how specific demographic groups—women,
men, and the elderly, for example—are differentially impacted by climatic and
environmental change (Beaumier and Ford 2010; Graves 2005; Lewis 2011), but
generally, much more needs to be known about who is staying in these
communities, why, and what these changes mean in terms of the likely human
burden of climate change and extreme events moving forward.
To be clear, our analysis does not undermine the original point of Alaska
climigration discussions: the need for government-supported relocation. Nor does it
cast any doubt on the urgency of this problem, especially in places where climatelinked erosion poses a growing threat to infrastructure, homes, and safety. If
anything, as these places continue to grow and change demographically, our
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analysis suggests that the urgency of problem is increasing. Relocation or individual
movements will certainly occur from the most exposed locations, and hopefully
before disasters occur. The scope of future climate-related migration should be
visible through analysis along the lines of this paper, and the general approach could
be applied elsewhere as well. Initially conceived as one social science counterpart to
the Arctic monitoring efforts of natural scientists (AMAP 2016; SAON 2016), the
community-level time series follow in the spirit of the Arctic Observing Network
(Kruse et al. 2011) and Arctic Social Indicators (Larsen et al. 2010, 2015) projects.
Both social and physical data reveal an Arctic rapidly changing.
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